Sub-Provision: In a case of correcting a PTIP in which there is a misconfiguration of a technical specification, and where the POOL pool multi-sig has enough voting power to single-handedly pass the proposal. The multi-sig can enact this vote, as soon as possible.
What is interesting is that this now applies to all proposals!
This means that on-chain governance voting is now defensive. I.e. if the Snapshot delegate decided to attack the system, then on-chain votes would be required to defend PoolTogether.
Given that an attack is incredibly unlikely, what this means is that we can govern with minimal gas costs. This is great for everybody! As long as we have enough defensive votes on-chain the protocol is secure.
Given the big success of the POOL pool (already 180k POOL deposited) we could consider increasing the drip rate to higher than 100 POOL/day. 100 was chosen conservatively as we didn’t know how much POOL would go into the POOL pool.
Maybe it’s better to leave it as is though, so that there’s no contention around that change which splits the unanimous support of PTIP-3.
Yeah, I think since this is a redo based on a technicality we should keep it the same. Revisit POOL distribution across the board will be done soon anyway.
One of the game theory issues the POOL pool creates is it disincentives voting on chain if you are not one of the 200k+ addresses. If you have 20k pool , even if the reward is very small you might as well try and win the POOL pool vote instead of voting on chain outside the POOL. You have a big sway in where 200k+ votes will go and if you get defeated you would have got defeated anyway on chain. There is no point voting on chain unless you have 200k + votes so you might as well vote in the POOL. It is a small risk as Brendan points out, but 2 of 4 multisig is really cutting it thin imo if the POOL pool eventually has more POOL in it than the vested POOL that’s eligible to vote. I think we should make this more robust sooner rather than sweep it under the carpet.
I think creating a uniswap LP incentive is even more important to do with this consideration. Over time this POOL will likely converge to be greater than the on chain votes. Directing some POOL to other yield sources is a good idea.
I know this has already been implemented, and that I’m late to the party, and probably no one pays this reply heed as a result. I know why the community would want this, as it allows users to earn with tokens that otherwise just sit around in wallets, something we’re used to having (grown to expect, even) in the broader crypto community. I also know that having a community feel rewarded for investing their time and resources into a project is a very real, legitimate reason to do something, as community morale and increasing the dedication of each community member can have beneficial, sometimes hard to measure, effects.
With all of that that said though, and I know I won’t be mincing words here, but - this feels like a very short sighted idea that creates negative value long-term.
If I understand correctly, the deposited POOL tokens in this pool aren’t actually put to work in any way. They just sit there. So no value is being created (as compared with other governed pools that earns interest that (1) increases prize amounts / attracts more users and (2) contributes a portion to reserves).
At the same time, we’re draining POOL from the treasury, which could alternatively be used to help grow the protocol through marketing, education, incentives for new users to join and participate, etc. Which means the distribution is a positive for participating depositers at the expense of ALL depositors and the overall protocol.
So to me, the math says, this is a net negative. It’s a short-term cash grab that ends up diluting the value long-temr of the very protocol the tokens represent.
(I don’t think anyone had bad intentions or anything, this community is awesome and I hope to contribute more in the future and I’ll probably even deposit into it myself if it stays, I just wanted to be frank for the sake of inspiring more discussion and/or action.)
This pool allows for gasless voting via snapshot and adds a bit of utility to the POOL tokens in the form of some interest being earned on your POOL(11.75% currently). The amount of POOL allocated is actually a pretty insignificant amount being drawn from treasury at 36,500 POOL (+ 5200 POOL) per year. Anybody who is in this for the long haul is happy to be in the POOL pool growing their stake. The APY on the POOL pool might be the reason why a whale earning POOL on his/her DAI pool deposit decides to keep it instead of dumping it.
I had a similar opinion to yours at first. What made that change is that I now view the POOL pool distribution as a mechanism to distribute POOL among the long-term aligned community. Not as an expense. It’s not actually necessarily beneficial, from a decentralization perspective, to have over 50% of total POOL locked up in the treasury.
We had some quite extensive discussions on this in the main post. Here’s the link to where I personally changed my mind:
TheRealTuna - I draw a little concern with the scenario of whales potentially dumping their position - shouldn’t the token accumulating more value be the main driver for holding? It feels like we’re solving a short-term problem with a long-term expense. And if getting whales not to dump is truly a goalpost, as I expect an argument is something along the lines of “if they dump, token goes down, which means APY goes down on governed pools, so less people participate”, my concern is that this just proves that an unhealthy % of people participating in governed pools are doing it solely for accumulating POOL, which would make me concerned longer-term about user participation for the core protocol behavior, assuming we don’t do something like increase the reserve rate to get more long-term value from this subset of users.
Torgin - I’m still trying to wrap my head around what exactly the repercussions are of having a large % locked up in treasury (for better or worse I just haven’t taken every scenario to its end point). So I’d love to learn more if there were previous discussions on this / any generic resources online. Additionally, the aspect around this action diluting the value of investors / core team members holdings makes sense. I’m not sure it’s compelling enough to do it, but it’s definitely a valid consideration.
Overall I’m really pumped about the protocol. I’m just hoping enough tokens are allocated in a way that creates additional long-term value for the protocol before too much of it gets diluted without getting enough back in return.
