this all sounds reasonable to me.
how many people needed for the multisig?
i would propose we start with PT team members and a discord community advocate and set some kind of term limit. maybe after a year the multisig ownership could transfer to new people. not sure if that works.
this all sounds reasonable to me.
I will support this proposal
Correct, when you deposit into the POOL pool, you would now vote via snapshot and your previous vote delegations would not work.
- Rewards cycle:1 Year
- Drip rate: My preference would be 500/per day but I would settle for the 200 or 255 per day others have mentioned. My thought is that the most POOL should go to the longterm POOL holders and to the most popular pools(Currently DAI and USDC). Would be fine with temporarily setting something in place but we should revisit this when deciding on the rates for other pools.
- Early exit fee: 10%
- Fee decay time: 28 days (Would choose longer if it were possible.)
- Number of winners 3-5
- Would love to see gasless voting via snapshot.
hmm if POOL moves to gasless voting - and the delegations no longer work - should there be some sort of consideration for those who spent the eth to delegate their POOL on sybil?
its not that big of a deal i imagine but something to consider potentially - or it can just be chalked up to a fast moving space.
Props to @RegisIsland for getting a poll put together for this:
I also added point 7). Delegator loss of votes from POOL pool incentive conflict. We could just sweep it under the rug and deal with it when it happens is one way to go or we could think pre-emptively for a solution before making a proposal for the POOL pool.
Some things that have sprung up in the discord to alleviate this problem:
1). Lower the 10k proposal creation threshold
2). Use the treasury in some convoluted way to reinstate the delegators that lost their 10k+ status
3). Whale altruism
4). Actively engage with a whale(s) informally to delegate their votes instead of using the POOL pool and maybe the treasury rewards that specific whale or whales through a treasury vote after a period of time.
i hate to postpone a crucial proposal, but i feel like we need a solution to this issue beforehand. this could grind governance to a halt.
I think a drip/prize rate of 255 POOL/day is too high.
If 330k POOL were in the POOL pool (which is the total amount of POOL delegated at the moment, minus investors with locked coins) that would give a staking APR of 28%. If the size of the pool is smaller, that APR increases even more.
What goal are we accomplishing by paying out so much money from the treasury to stakers?
When funding liquidity mining for the standard pools, we get assets deposited that generate interest. This interest can be captured through the reserve functionality, generating revenue for the protocol. Here we are giving out tokens to stakers, “rewarding” them without getting anything concrete in return.
Another problem with the POOL pool being so profitable, is that if the pool’s voting multisig has more than 50% of all votes, that centralizes control of the entire protocol to the individuals controlling that multisig. This is a significant risk. Gasless voting is not decentralized.
This may not be an issue for the next year, as a significant amount of POOL belonging to investors and core team is locked and may not be put in the POOL pool.
I think it makes most sense for the PT team to be holders of the Multi-sig + another entity in the space with a vested interest in protecting the protocol (such that they lose credibility if acting maliciously). Maybe someone could reach out to Argent to see if they would be interested. I mean, they are one of the largest POOL delegates after all, they should take on the responsibility that comes with that
Good point on the gasless voting, I had not thought of it. Less keen on this idea just because of that. Think there’s a lot more to think about with a POOL pool than meets the eye and we probably should not rush this out.
On 5. number of winners, I want to remark that having more winners is more expensive in terms of gas.
The cost for awarding is calculated as follows: 450k + numberOfWinners*290k + 2 LINK.
Here is how much it costs, assuming an ETH price of $1834, LINK price of $30 and gas price of 110 gwei.
0 winners: Free!
1 winner: $210
2 winners: $268
3 winners: $326
4 winners: $384
5 winners: $442
As such, I think having the drawings take place less than once a week could be a good option.
I also think there shouldn’t be a lot of winners, as they are expensive.
Another option is to not have any winners at all. This would eliminate gas costs entirely, and the POOL which would otherwise be spent on gas can be fully used to drip to users.
Source: ⛽ Gas Usage - PoolTogether 3.0
I agree with @Torgin last sentence.
To me it should be no winner with low drip rate
i disagree. the core conept of PT is a lottery. i think there should be a weekly prize.
Yep understand but i don’t see it has a lottery but more has a way for holders to get rewarded… something like staking
The main reason I like having more winners is that they are also winning voting power and I like spreading that around. My choice would either be for No winners or if there are winners we should spread it out to several(Having winners is more fun though). Gas is less of a concern than fair distribution of voting power in my opinion.
Agreed, Tuna. selfishly i also want a chance to win a sizable prize. i will still be kind of a fish in the pool pool ya know. i wont earn many pool tokens still. i only have 200 POOL
After thinking about it some more, I now support a drip rate of 255 POOL/day (possibly split between drip and prize).
What has changed for me is that I am now thinking about it as a mechanism to distribute POOL to the community, instead of an expense.
One thing that I only realized today, is that we actually do want to get a significant amount of POOL into circulation, as this is what was assumed during the distribution of POOL to core team members and Pooltogether Inc. investors. Together they have 20% of the token supply. If for example 50% of all POOL would just stay in the treasury forever, that would put their share at 40% artificially.
So the question isn’t really DO we distribute POOL, but more about HOW do we distribute the POOL to longterm aligned users. Due to the large and long early exit fee, the POOL pool could offer that.
Agree！ I’ve changed my mind too.(我也改变了我的看法）
let’s have a poll on both then